|501 East Front Street,
Butte, Montana 59701
(406) 782-2573 / 1-800-929-2611
Montana Relay: 711 - Fax: (406) 782-2781
(FHA Admendment Acts of 1988 part 3)
Despite argument that individual cannot properly be enjoined from making racial representations to obtain business of potential seller when racial statement represents truth, federal government may in some circumstances prohibit purely commercial speech made in connection with conduct which Congress can permissibly regulate or prohibit; any informational value in statements violative of 42 USCS § 3604(e) is clearly outweighed by government's overriding interest in preventing blockbusting. United States v Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. (1973, CA5 Ga) 474 F2d 115, cert den 414 US 826, 38 L Ed 2d 59, 94 S Ct 131, reh den 414 US 1087, 38 L Ed 2d 494, 94 S Ct 610.
District Court erred in finding that real estate agent committed unlawful "blockbusting" in violation of 42 USCS § 3604(e), when agent mailed cards to residents in racially transitional neighborhood seeking buyer for house in neighborhood, which was ultimately sold to white buyer, since solicitation card was racially neutral, and since there was no evidence of panic selling or other incidents of racially charged atmosphere that would impute to any real estate solicitation racial connotation. Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc. (1985, CA6 Ohio) 774 F2d 135.
Representations by real estate agent to plaintiff that "blacks are moving in. . . you should sell while you can still get a good price. . . the neighborhood is getting black and would be unsafe to live in. . ." constitute type of representations proscribed by 42 USCS § 3604; it makes no difference under statute that "busting" of "block" where plaintiff lived was not accomplished or even advanced due to plaintiff's subsequent refusal to move, since liability of defendant is not dependent upon success of its unlawful conduct. Sanborn v Wagner (1973, DC Md) 354 F Supp 291.
Words "for profit" in 42 USCS § 3604 mean for purpose of obtaining financial gain in any form; therefore, though pleadings and testimony do not evidence extent of profit made as result of transaction in which real estate agent induced plaintiff to sell property because Negroes were moving into neighborhood, fact that defendant stood to gain 6 percent real estate commission on sale of plaintiff's property sufficiently satisfies statutory requirement that defendant's unlawful inducement or attempted inducement was made "for profit." Sanborn v Wagner (1973, DC Md) 354 F Supp 291.
Uninvited solicitations for sale of homes in racially transitional neighborhood are prohibited under 42 USCS § 3604(e) if they are (1) made for profit, (2) intended to induce sale of dwelling, and (3) convey idea that members of particular race are entering neighborhood even if race is not explicitly mentioned. Zuch v Hussey (1973, ED Mich) 366 F Supp 553.
Realtor does not violate Fair Housing Act (42 USCS § 3604(e)) if he answers in good faith homeowner's question about prospective buyer's race provided answer is not in terms that would encourage owner to sell, and is not made for specific purpose of causing owner to sell. United States v Saroff (1974, ED Tenn) 377 F Supp 352, affd without op (CA6 Tenn) 516 F2d 902.
Finding that owners of apartment complex "steered" black into separate section of complex is not clearly erroneous where 95% of all blacks renting in complex during 2-year period were rented apartments in same section comprised of four buildings at remote end of complex and 53% of all black tenants were located in same building within this section. United States v Mitchell (1978, CA5 Tex) 580 F2d 789.
District Court did not err in finding that real estate agent committed unlawful "racial steering" in violation of 42 USCS § 3604(a), where agent, when approached by black checker wanting to buy home, attempted to contact owner of home in black neighborhood, and where, after that home had been taken off market, agent suggested no other homes to checker even though homes in white neighborhood were on market. Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc. (1985, CA6 Ohio) 774 F2d 135.
Remand would be required in racial discrimination in hiring action under 42 USCS §§ 1981, 1982 and 3601 et seq., where court erred in finding that there was no racial identification of prospective purchasers, evidence showed that real estate agent must at least have suspected potential purchasers were black, court needed to specifically explain whether statistical evidence purporting to show pattern and practice of refusing to sell homes to blacks was admissible, court erred in finding there was no evidence of pattern of steering, and court erroneously instructed that owner of realty franchise could not be held liable for real estate agent's actions as matter of law. Sanders v Dorris (1989, CA6 Tenn) 873 F2d 938.
"Steering" or action by real estate agent impeding, delaying, or discouraging prospective home buyer from purchasing housing in particular area on racial basis is unlawful under 42 USCS § 3604(a). Zuch v Hussey (1973, ED Mich) 366 F Supp 553.
Practice of deliberately steering potential renters or buyers to particular area on basis of race violates 42 USCS § 3604(a). United States v Henshaw Bros., Inc. (1975, ED Va) 401 F Supp 399.
Tactics of racial steering, directing white potential home buyers away from Black or interracial neighborhoods, and directing Black potential buyers away from white neighborhoods, are clear violation of 42 USCS § 3604(a) and such tactics render both real estate broker and multiple listing service liable for violation of statute. Fair Housing Council, Inc. v Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc. (1976, DC NJ) 422 F Supp 1071.
"Otherwise make unavailable or deny" language of 42 USCS § 3604(a) applies to racial "steering". United States v American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers etc. (1977, ND Ill) 442 F Supp 1072, 24 FR Serv 2d 880, app dismd (CA7 Ill) 590 F2d 242, 48 ALR Fed 657.
Racial steering in sale or rental of real estate, defined as use of word, phrase, or act by real estate broker or salesperson which is intended to influence choice of prospective property buyer on racial bases, is violation of 42 USCS § 3604 and may be established by proof of either purpose or effect. Bellwood v Dwayne Realty (1979, ND Ill) 482 F Supp 1321.
Alleged actions of racial steering by realty companies such as encouraging white testers to consider realty listings in predominently white areas while disparaging homes in integrated or predominently black areas, discouraging black tester from considering homes in predominently white areas and providing black tester with less service than that provided to white testers, are actionable under 42 USCS §§ 1981, 1982 and 3604. Sherman Park Community Asso. v Wauwatosa Realty Co. (1980, ED Wis) 486 F Supp 838.
Racial steering, while not specifically mentioned in Act is proscribed by portion of 3604(a) which makes it unlawful to "otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race"; unlawful racial steering is use of word or phrase or action by real estate broker or sales person which is intended to influence choice of prospective property buyer on racial basis; under such definition intent to steer must be shown to prove unlawful racial steering; it is not necessary for steering to be successful in order for act to violate section inasmuch as attempts to steer are also proscribed; test used to determine whether statement constitutes racial steering in violation of section is not effect of racial statement on hearer but rather effect statement would have if heard by reasonable person, under similar circumstances, who was seeking housing. Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc. (1983, ND Ohio) 629 F Supp 1232.
Court, in wide variety of factual circumstances, determined whether or not individual incidents constituted racial steering. Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc. (1983, ND Ohio) 629 F Supp 1232.
Eight instances of racial steering upon which non-profit corporation based discrimination action, 4 nonrelated racial steering incidents, and management of real estate agency's acquiescence in actions, demonstrated corporate intent to violate Fair Housing Act. Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc. (1983, ND Ohio) 629 F Supp 1232.
Minority homeseekers' suit under 42 USCS § 3604(a) against area planning association is dismissed, where homeseekers' claims that planning association engaged in racial "steering," directing prospective home buyers interested in equivalent properties to different areas according to their race, since planning association was nonprofit corporation with purpose of providing limited information to persons making "non-traditional moves," defined as white persons moving into integrated areas or minority persons moving into predominantly white, nonintegrated areas, and fully informed homeseekers of its policy; association did not affect availability of housing as it did not participate in any commercial transaction, owns no real estate, is not real estate agent or broker, is not associated with agents or brokers, and housing information regarding traditional moves was available through all commercial channels which were unaffected by association's activity. Steptoe v Beverly Area Planning Asso. (1987, ND Ill) 674 F Supp 1313.
16. Zoning and land use ordinances
Under disparate impact test for evaluating claim that Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 USCS §§ 3601 et seq.) had been violated by refusal of town board to amend zoning restriction so as to permit construction of private multifamily housing projects outside town's designated urban renewal area, prima facie case of discriminatory disparate impact was shown, and sole justification offered, that such restriction would encourage developers to invest in deteriorated and needy section of town, proffered to rebut prima facie case was inadequate, where record showed (1) town had about 200,000 residents, 95 percent of whom were white and less than 4 percent blacks, (2) almost 75 percent of black population was clustered in 6 tracts in 2 areas, (3) of town's remaining 42 tracts, 30 were at least 99 percent white, (4) urban renewal area was section in and around one such minority-cluster area, and contained 52 percent minority residents, and (5) although restrictions permitted town's housing authority to build multifamily housing townwide, only such existing public housing-authority project was within urban renewal area. Huntington v Huntington Branch, NAACP (1988, US) 102 L Ed 2d 180, 109 S Ct 276.
Finding of racially discriminatory action is proper where city officials adopted moratorium on new subdivisions after plans for low-income housing project became viable, and zoned proposed sites as open space and park area. Kennedy Park Homes Asso. v Lackawanna (1970, CA2 NY) 436 F2d 108, cert den 401 US 1010, 28 L Ed 2d 546, 91 S Ct 1256 and (disapproved on other grounds Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 48 L Ed 2d 597, 96 S Ct 2040, 12 BNA FEP Cas 1415, 11 CCH EPD P 10958).
City zoning ordinance prohibiting construction of housing designed to meet needs of families earning between $5000 and $10000 per year had discriminatory effect on blacks, notwithstanding that class included 32 per cent of black and 29 per cent of white population in metropolitan area, where ultimate effect of ordinance was to foreclose 85% of blacks living in metropolitan area from obtaining housing in city at time when 40 per cent of them were living in substandard or overcrowded units, and segregated housing in metropolitan area was result of inexorable process of deliberate racial discrimination in housing by real estate industry and by agencies of federal, state, and local governments. United States v Black Jack (1974, CA8 Mo) 508 F2d 1179, cert den 422 US 1042, 45 L Ed 2d 694, 95 S Ct 2656, reh den 423 US 884, 46 L Ed 2d 115, 96 S Ct 158.
Overwhelmingly white suburbs' zoning regulation which restricted private multi-housing projects to largely minority urban renewal area, and Town Board's refusal to amend that ordinance to allow construction of subsidized housing in a white neighborhood, violated Fair Housing Act (42 USCS §§ 3601 et seq.). Huntington Branch, NAACP v Huntington (1988, CA2 NY) 844 F2d 926.
Ordinance challenging zoning regulation which limited transitional dwellings to total of 6 persons and supervisory family would have impact on group homes established for abused women, but such did not alone establish discriminatory effect, because resident limitation would have comparative effect on males if transitional dwellings were established for them or other groups. Doe v Butler (1989, CA3 Pa) 892 F2d 315.
State statutes and city zoning ordinances requiring dispersal of group homes for mentally ill persons throughout communities did not violate 42 USCS § 3604, notwithstanding claim that disbersal requirements limited housing choices of mentally handicapped and therefore conflicted with language and purposes of Fair Housing Act, since disbersal requirement was part of licensing process as legitimate means to achieve state's goals in process of de-institutionalization of mentally ill. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v St. Paul (1991, CA8 Minn) 923 F2d 91, reh den, en banc (CA8) 1991 US App LEXIS 2594.
Zoning ordinance imposing special safety requirements on residence operated by non-profit corporation for benefit of four mentally retarded adult women violated FHAA because it imposed safety requirements more stringent than those applied to other single-family residences, and ordinance made no effort to tailor safety requirements to particular disabilities of residents, and requirement that non-profit corporation seek zoning variance was unduly burdensome. Marbrunak, Inc. v Stow (1992, CA6) 974 F2d 43.
Court erred in finding that city intentionally discriminated against handicapped persons in violation of 42 USCS § 3604 by not allowing 12 residents--rather than limit of 6 residents--to live in single family zoned residence, where finding of intentional discrimination was based on city officials' in-court interpretation of single family zoning requirement and court's belief that city council members' expressed concern about parking was pretextual; case would be remanded for determination whether reasonable accommodation under FHA required that city spot zone or amend its neutral zoning ordinance to provide for homes for handicapped persons with more than 6 residents. Smith & Lee Assocs. v City of Taylor (1993, CA6 Mich) 13 F3d 920, 3 ADD 786, reh, en banc, den (CA6) 1994 US App LEXIS 4423.
Putative real estate developer failed to show discriminatory effect of town zoning change in violation of Fair Housing Act, where developer made no allegation concerning community harm or adverse impact on particular minority group, and provided no evidentiary support for its conclusion that proposal to construct condominium homes beginning at price of $109,000 would actually constitute affordable housing for economically disadvantaged minorites. Orange Lake Assocs. v Kirkpatrick (1994, CA2 NY) 21 F3d 1214.
Evidence was sufficient to establish that village violated Orthodox Jews' rights under FHA and First Amendment by enacting zoning ordinance restricting use of private homes for religious ceremonies with intent of deterring Orthodox Jews from purchasing homes in village. LeBlanc-Sternberg v Fletcher (1995, CA2 NY) 67 F3d 412.
City fire inspector and assistant city attorney were not liable in action under Fair Housing Act alleging that defendants prevented opening of treatment center for emotionally disturbed women, where at time of challenged conduct, FHA did not extend personal liability to conduct of municipal officials who were not involved in selling or renting of property, and who did not have decision-making authority to make dwelling unavailable. Meadowbriar Home for Children v Gunn (1996, CA5 Tex) 81 F3d 521.
Village was not required to grant variance to developer to allow demolition of single family house and replacement by 4 unit, 2 story building with modification for handicapped persons on 2 ground floor units in order to accommodate potential tenants' handicaps; under § 3604, permission to build multi-tenant housing in single-family zoned area was not accommodation, where no variance was necessary to allow handicapped persons to live in town, and costs to town of multi-family unit included increased flooding potential caused by multi-family building. Brandt v Village of Chebanse (1996, CA7 Ill) 82 F3d 172.
Spacing and notice requirements of Michigan Adult Foster Care Licensing Act were preempted by FHA and facially discriminatory, and 1,500 foot spacing requirement allegedly promulgated to integrate disabled into community and to prevent clustering, and required notification to municipality or neighbors of housing facility for 4 disabled adults, were not justified to meet needs of handicapped. Larkin v Michigan Dep't of Social Servs. (1996, CA6 Mich) 89 F3d 285.
Court's finding that city's decision to deny zoning petition of company operating adult foster care home was motivated by discriminatory animus was erroneous, where city reasonably interpreted established zoning ordinance as characterizing 12 person adult foster care home as multiple-family use, and neither fact that city permitted homeowners in single-family neighborhoods to run home businesses while prohibiting for-profit company from operating 12 person adult foster care home, nor comments by city council member that fire safety and property values might be compromised by 12 person adult foster care home in single family neighborhood, showed discriminatory animus toward handicapped. Smith & Lee Assocs. v City of Taylor (1996, CA6 Mich) 102 F3d 781.
Property owner's intentional discrimination claim under Fair Housing Act, following denial of his conditional use permit application to build housing for elderly disabled adults in single-family residential area, was properly dismissed, where property owner failed to allege that city granted permit to similarly situated party during same time period, city's concern for character of neighborhood was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and no evidence suggested city's proffered reason for denying permit was pretextual, or that city had discriminatory intent or motive. Gamble v City of Escondido (1997, CA9 Cal) 104 F3d 300, 19 ADD 740, 97 CDOS 263, 97 Daily Journal DAR 473.
Suit charging discriminatory zoning against low-cost and multi-family housing project is inapplicable under 42 USCS § 3604. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v Union City (1970, ND Cal) 314 F Supp 967, affd (CA9) 424 F2d 291 (disapproved on other grounds Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 48 L Ed 2d 597, 96 S Ct 2040, 12 BNA FEP Cas 1415, 11 CCH EPD P 10958).
Zoning ordinance, effect of which is to regulate and restrict housing density in certain hilly and mountainous areas of city, and which does not, on its face or as applied, discriminate against anyone on racial, ethnic or income grounds, does not violate 42 USCS § 3604. Confederacion De La Raza Unida v Morgan Hill (1971, ND Cal) 324 F Supp 895.
Where county acquired approximately half of abandoned military base, upon which it proposed land use patterns, including construction of educational, cultural, and civil center, commercial and light industrial buildings, recreational facilities, convention center, natural reserve, bus depot, and senior citizen housing, but complainants sought injunction requiring county to establish land use patterns calling for construction of low income housing on nondiscriminatory basis on same property, 42 USCS § 3604 was not violated and proof of racial discrimination in land use patterns was not established by proof of purpose or effect of county's intention to preclude construction of housing, except for senior citizens, on acquired property, since proposed land use had rational and legitimate governmental purpose. Acevedo v Nassau County (1974, ED NY) 369 F Supp 1384, affd (CA2 NY) 500 F2d 1078.
Where plaintiff in exclusionary zoning case proves violation of 42 USCS § 3604(a) it also proves violation of § 3617; municipality's refusal to zone for multiple use particular property upon which proposed apartment complex is to be built, does not establish cause of action under § 3604(a) or § 3617, since consruction of complex would have only de minimis impact on pattern of segregated housing in municipal area, in light of evidence that minorities are significantly underrepresented in particular area, and that substantial majority of residents of proposed complex would be white. Re Malone (1984, ED Mo) 592 F Supp 1135.
City does not violate Fair Housing Act (42 USCS § 3604) by changing parcel's land use designation from general commercial, which does not allow residential development, to intermediate density residential, which does; while city has statutory obligation to refrain from zoning policies that foreclose construction of low cost housing within corporate boundaries, there is no similar statutory obligation to allow hotel construction. Litton International Dev. Corp. v Simi Valley (1985, CD Cal) 616 F Supp 275.
Real estate developer denied municipal permit to remodel building for occupancy by persons with AIDS is entitled to injunction under 42 USCS § 3604, since developer was likely to succeed on merits of allegation that denial resulted from irrational fear of intended occupants, financial loss to developer outweighed any harm to city, and injunction would not harm public interest, since public concern for safety was based on misperception of danger from AIDS. Baxter v Belleville (1989, SD Ill) 720 F Supp 720.
Puerto Rico agency charged with responsibility of issuing land use permits is enjoined from refusing to issue special use permit for operation of AIDS hospice, where there was absolutely no evidence that tenancy of 10 terminal AIDS patients in hospice carried significant threat to safety of community but much evidence that reason given for decision to deny permit--fact that land was zoned agricultural--was mere pretext. Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v Regulations & Permits Admin. (1990, DC Puerto Rico) 740 F Supp 95.
Village violated 42 USCS § 3604(f)(3)(B) by failing to grant variance under state law to group home for mentally ill to locate within 2500 feet of group home for elderly, where group homes would be separated by wide unbridged portion of river, because village board had no evidence to support finding that group home would have significant adverse impact on goals of state law or would impose expense or burden on Village. United States v Marshall (1992, WD Wis) 787 F Supp 872.
Town plan and zoning commission is preliminarily enjoined from requiring special exception in connection with use of 2-family residence to house up to 7 HIV-infected persons, where commission cannot demonstrate legitimate zoning basis for decision to require application for special exception, and its actions seem driven by community opposition based on fear of AIDS, because balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of foundation seeking to help HIV-infected persons facing homelessness, and foundation has shown likelihood of success on its claimed violations of 42 USCS §§ 3604(f)(1), 3604(f)(3)(B), and 3617. Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v Town Plan & Zoning Com. (1992, DC Conn) 790 F Supp 1197.
Mentally handicapped man's challenge to conditions in use permit granted residential group home he shared with other mentally handicapped men fails, where group home operator was required to provide 24-hour supervision of residents and to establish community advisory committee through which complaints and concerns of neighbors could be addressed, because city ordinance and state statute on which it was based reflect rational legislative concerns that handicapped be integrated into normal surroundings and properly supervised as part of that process, and they do not violate 42 USCS § 3604. Bangerter v Orem City Corp. (1992, DC Utah) 797 F Supp 918.
Claim of residents of group home for recovering alcohol and/or drug dependents against town is granted summarily, where town sought to evict residents by enforcing zoning limitation on number of unrelated persons that could live in home, because (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the eviction would discriminate against residents because of their handicap since recovering addicts are more likely than those without handicaps to live with unrelated individuals, and (2) showing of discriminatory effect far outweighs town's asserted interest in maintaining zone's residential character since town received no substantial complaints from neighbors, house is well maintained, and it does not alter residential character. Oxford House, Inc. v Babylon (1993, ED NY) 819 F Supp 1179, 1 ADD 872.
Wheelchair-bound resident is not entitled to mandatory injunction requiring town zoning board to allow construction of wheelchair-accessible addition to single-family house since resident has not established reasonable probability of success where there is no evidence of special impositions on handicapped persons, of discriminatory intent, or of occurrence of discriminatory practices, where 42 USCS § 3603(b) exempts single-family houses from requirements of 42 USCS § 3604, and where zoning restrictions are not discriminatory on their face, but town's motion to dismiss is denied since resident may be able to establish discriminatory intent. Pulcinella v Ridley Township (1993, ED Pa) 822 F Supp 204, 2 ADD 745, vacated, complaint dismd (ED Pa) slip op.
"Neighbor notification" requirement of county code regulatory scheme is invalid, where prospective provider of group home services to elderly must notify neighbors and civic organizations of type of disabilities of persons who will live in group home, because requirement on its face creates explicit classification based on disability in contravention of 42 USCS § 3604(f)(1), and is not supported by any justification of county. Potomac Group Home Corp. v Montgomery County (1993, DC Md) 823 F Supp 1285, 2 ADD 198.
City is ordered to issue zoning and use permit for proposed group-home site which recites that it is reasonable accommodation within meaning of 42 USCS § 3604(f)(3)(B), where project may lose grant funds if zoning dispute pending before state supreme court is not resolved, because, under § 3604(f)(3)(B), cities "must change, waive, or make exceptions in their zoning rules to afford people with disabilities same opportunity to housing as those who are without disabilities." United States v City of Philadelphia (1993, ED Pa) 838 F Supp 223, 4 ADD 779.
Developer of adult foster-care facility is denied relief on claim under 42 USCS § 3604(f), where argument is that failure to grant special-use permit for facility amounted to not making "reasonable accommodations" for developer in violation of statute, because city more than reasonably accommodated developer, after rejecting first site as inconsistent with its land-use plan, by arranging through real estate agent developer's acquisition and its approval of alternate site for facility. Thornton v City of Allegan (1993, WD Mich) 863 F Supp 504, 7 ADD 661.
State statute requiring notification to residents whose property is located within 1,500 feet of proposed adult foster care home and which prevents licensing of proposed facility if proposed site is within 1,500 feet of another similar institution violates Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) (42 USCS § 3604(f)) and is preempted by FHAA, where state statutory requirements would have prevented applicant's facility from being licensed due to its proximity to similar facility, because state statutes have discriminatory effect on handicapped people by making housing less available to them. Larkin v Michigan (1994, ED Mich) 883 F Supp 172, 8 ADD 422.
City must pay $284,000 actual damages of housing corporation and $20,000 penalty, and must amend its zoning ordinance to allow more mid-sized adult foster care (AFC) homes in its single-family neighborhoods, where city has not approved any housing for handicapped persons in area that was not in or adjacent to less desirable multiple-family use, effectively denying elderly disabled population equal opportunity to obtain housing of their choice in single-family residential areas, because city has violated 42 USCS § 3604(f)(1)(B), and its "not in my backyard" attitude, reflected in wide array of insensitive and discriminatory actions taken throughout its long battle to keep AFC homes out of its single-family neighborhoods, is inexcusable and intolerable. United States v City of Taylor (1995, ED Mich) 872 F Supp 423, 8 ADD 1156.
Rehabilitation institute and disabled person state claim for violation of Fair Housing Act (42 USCS §§ 3601 et seq.), where they assert that borough officials intentionally prevented institute from establishing transitional living facility, designed to treat and to house approximately 20 disabled persons, by enacting municipal ordinance and initiating condemnation proceedings in court under pretext of acquiring property for public park, because alleged actions constitute "discriminatory housing practice" under § 3604. Kessler Inst. for Rehabilitation v Mayor of Essex Fells (1995, DC NJ) 876 F Supp 641, 8 ADD 837.
Operator of handicapped adult-care facilities is granted preliminary injunction barring enforcement of city's ordinance imposing absolute one-year moratorium on establishment of new adult-care facilities, where ordinance was enacted as result of alleged problems with handicapped residents at operator's existing facility, because (1) ordinance clearly discriminates against handicapped, (2) proffered justifications for ordinance were pretexts for true motive to exclude mentally impaired from moving into city, and (3) even if city's proffered reasons are taken as true, reasons fail to justify ordinance because ordinance is grossly overbroad. Epicenter of Steubenville v City of Steubenville (1996, SD Ohio) 924 F Supp 845.
State law violated 42 USCS § 3604(f), where state law authorized municipalities to treat as conditional use any community residence or shelter housing 7 or more persons, to deny conditional use permit to any such proposed residence or shelter housing of over 7 persons that would be located within 1,500 feet of another community residence or shelter, and to deny permit whenever number of persons living in existing community residences or shelters in locality exceeded 50 persons or 0.5 percent of population. ARC of New Jersey v New Jersey (1996, DC NJ) 950 F Supp 637, 20 ADD 149.
17. Miscellaneous practices
Violation of 42 USCS § 3604 exists where white landlord evicts white tenants because they have entertained black guests in their apartment. Woods-Drake v Lundy (1982, CA5 Miss) 667 F2d 1198.
Municipality's withdrawal from multi-municipality housing authority, which effectively blocked construction of 50 units of low-income housing adversely affected black population within community and was motivated by community's deeply-felt, intentional racial animus, and thus was in violation of both Fourteenth Amendment and Fair Housing Act (42 USCS § 3604). Smith v Clarkton (1982, CA4 NC) 682 F2d 1055.
Black former insurance agent fails to state cause of action under 42 USCS §§ 3604 and 3605 against insurer based on insurer's alleged practice of "redlining," defined as arbitrary refusal to underwrite risks of persons residing in predominantly black neighborhoods, since neither section prohibits alleged hazard insurance redlining practice. Mackey v Nationwide Ins. Cos. (1984, CA4 NC) 724 F2d 419, 33 CCH EPD P 34048, 1984-1 CCH Trade Cases P 65795.
District Court did not err in deciding that totality of circumstances establishes that city blocked, with racially discriminatory intent, development of racially integrated low-income senior citizen and family housing by private corporation, in light of facts that several residents who opposed project expressed concern about "those people", referring to blacks, coming to city, and that city took action which eventually made it impossible for private corporation to continue negotiations on project. United States v Birmingham (1984, CA6 Mich) 727 F2d 560.
Black tenants who reside in particular building of 3-building, high-rise apartment complex established prima facie case of discriminatory impact in violation of 42 USCS § 3604 resulting from all-adult conversion policy for said building, since, of total number of men, women and children living in said building, 74.9 percent of non-whites were given eviction notices while only 26.4 percent of white received such notices. Betsey v Turtle Creek Associates (1984, CA4 Md) 736 F2d 983.
Black county residents fail to state cause of action against county under 42 USCS § 3604(a) or (b), based on allegations that county's discriminatory refusal to properly maintain, repair, or demolish property to which it holds tax deed in county has damaged plaintiffs' neighboring properties through diminution in value, since § 3604(a) does not protect intangible interest in already-owned property, and since county decisions regarding how to administer properties it holds by tax deeds do not come within scope of § 3604(b) prohibition. Southend Neighborhood Improv. Asso. v County of St. Clair (1984, CA7 Ill) 743 F2d 1207.
Class consisting of low and moderate income persons who are on waiting list for proposed public housing do not state cause of action against municipality under Fair Housing Act (42 USCS §§ 3601 et seq.), arising from 2 municipal referendum votes which repealed ordinances granting housing authority authority to construct sewer extensions to proposed public housing sites; absent highly unusual circumstances, discriminatory effect of